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Abstract
The structure of social networks is a key determinant in fostering cooperation and other altruistic
behavior among naturally selfish individuals. However, most real social interactions are temporal,
being both finite in duration and spread out over time. This raises the question of whether stable
cooperation can form despite an intrinsically fragmented social fabric. Here we develop a framework
to study the evolution of cooperation on temporal networks in the setting of the classic Prisoner’s
Dilemma. By analyzing both real and synthetic datasets, we find that temporal networks generally
facilitate the evolution of cooperation compared to their static counterparts. More interestingly,
we find that the intrinsic human interactive pattern like bursty behavior impedes the evolution of
cooperation. Finally, we introduce a measure to quantify the temporality present in networks and
demonstrate that there is an intermediate level of temporality that boosts cooperation most. Our
results open a new avenue for investigating the evolution of cooperation in more realistic structured
populations.
∗ Corresponding authors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding and sustaining the evolution of cooperation in human and animal societies
have long been a challenge since Darwin [1–5]. Evolutionary game theory offers a prominent
paradigm to explain the emergence and persistence of cooperation among egoists, and many
results have been obtained from analytical calculations [4, 5], numerical simulations [5, 6],
and behavioral experiments [7–14]. Traditionally, researchers have been focusing on the
well-mixed or homogeneous population scenarios [2–4, 15]. Yet, both spatial population
structures and social networks suggest that real populations are typically not well-mixed.
Indeed, in a population some individuals may interact more likely than others do. In both
theory and experiments, the ideally well-mixed scenario has been extended to heterogeneous
structured populations represented by complex networks, where nodes represent individuals
and links capture who interacts with whom [11, 13, 15–17]. And a unifying framework coined
as network reciprocity is proposed for emergence of cooperation in structured populations
[18], especially for the networks with the degree heterogeneity which is typically observed in
scale-free networks [17, 19].
Despite their deep insights, those works all rely on a key assumption that the contact
graph or the interaction network of individuals is time invariant. In reality, this assumption
is often violated, especially in social networks, where contacts between individuals are typ-
ically short-lived. Emails and text messages for example represent near-instantaneous and
hence ephemeral links in a network. Even in cases where the contacts have non-negligible
durations — such as phone calls, or the face-to-face interactions between inpatients in the
same hospital ward — their finite nature means that the network structure is in constant
flux. It has been shown that the temporality of edge activations can noticeably affect var-
ious dynamical processes, ranging from the information or epidemics spreading [20–23] to
network accessibility [24] to controllability [25].
It is natural to expect that temporality will have a similarly profound effect in social
systems, particularly in situations when individuals engage in interactive behavior. Indeed,
if Alice interacts with Bob who only later betrays Charlie, Alice’s behavior toward Bob
could not have been influenced by his later treachery. Yet the links A—B—C would be
ever-present in a static representation of this social network. Despite some existing efforts
[26], up to our knowledge, the impact of temporal networks on the evolution of cooperation
has not been systematically explored. It is still unclear whether the temporality will enhance
the cooperation or not.
Here for the first time, we explore the impacts of temporality of human interactions on
the evolution of cooperation over both empirical and synthetic networks. Moreover, the
impacts of the bursty behavior rooted in human activity on the evolution of cooperation are
also investigated.
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II. MODEL
We conduct our investigation in the setting of classic evolutionary game theory, in which
each of two players may choose a strategy of cooperation (C) or defection (D). Each receives
a payoff R for mutual cooperation, and an amount P for mutual defection. When the
players’ strategies disagree, the defector receives a payoff T while the cooperator receives S.
These outcomes can be neatly encoded in the payoff matrix
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
where the entries give the payoff each player receives under different combinations of strategy.
For simplicity, we focus on the case where R = 1, T = b and S = P = 0, leaving the
sole parameter b > 1, which represents the temptation to defect and hence the system’s
tendency toward selfish behavior. This parameter choice corresponds to the classic Prisoner’s
Dilemma, wherein the optimal strategy for any single individual is to defect, while mutual
cooperation is the best choice for the alliance [15, 17, 27, 28].
Figure 1 illustrates the essence of our framework. We consider a temporal network to
be a sequence of separate networks on the same set of N nodes, which we call snapshots.
These snapshots are constructed from empirical data by aggregating social contacts over
successive windows of ∆t (Fig. 1a and 1b), yielding the links active in that snapshot. To
capture the interactions occurring on these networks, we initially set an equal fraction of
cooperators and defectors (network nodes) in the population on the first snapshot. At the
beginning of each generation (round of games), every individual i plays the above game
with each of its ki neighbors, accumulating a total payoff Pi according to the matrix above.
At the end of each generation each player i may change his or her strategy, by randomly
picking a neighbor j with payoff Pj from its ki neighbors, and then imitating j’s strategy
with probability (Pj − Pi)/(Dkd) if Pj > Pi. Here D = T − S and kd is the larger of ki
and kj [17, 29]. We repeat this procedure g times within each snapshot before changing
the network structure (Fig. 1c). In this way, g controls the timescale difference between
the dynamics on the network and the dynamics of the network. We continue running the
game, changing the network structure every g generations, until the system reaches a stable
fraction of cooperators, fc.
III. RESULTS
A. Temporal networks facilitate the evolution of cooperation
Our principal result is the temporal networks generally enhance cooperation relative to
their static counterparts, and allow it to persist at higher levels of temptation b. Figure 2
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shows the equilibrium fraction of cooperators fc for temporal networks formed from empirical
data of four social systems [30]: attendees at a scientific conference (ACM conference) [31],
students at a high school in Marseilles, France in two different years (Student 2012 [32],
Student 2013 [33]), and workers in an office building (Office 2013) [34]. In each of these
systems there exists a broad range of g over which fc is greater in the temporal network
than in its static equivalent, at almost all values of b. This is true even for small ∆t. Here
the network’s links are distributed over a large number of rarefied snapshots, leaving little
network “scaffolding” on which to build a stable cooperation. Nonetheless, there exists a
range of g that can compensate for this sparsity, again leaving temporal networks the victor.
Indeed, the only situation in which temporal networks are less amenable to cooperation than
static networks is when g is small. In this limit, the evolutionary timescale is comparable to
the dynamical timescale, and patterns of cooperation have no time to stabilize before being
disrupted by the next change in network structure.
To test whether these results arise from the specific temporal patterns in real social
systems, we have also simulated games on temporal versions of synthetic scale-free (SF)
[35] and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) [36] random networks (see Methods). We again find that with
almost level of temporality (i.e., g <∞), cooperators have an easier time gaining footholds
in the population (Fig. 3). Interestingly, the temporal scale free networks yield a higher
fc, all other things being equal, than the temporal ER networks (Fig. 3 and Fig. S1). As
such, temporality preserves the cooperative advantage of heterogenous populations, previous
observed in static networks [17].
B. Effects of burstiness on the evolution of cooperation
Analyses of the temporal patterns of human interactions in email [37], phone calls [37], and
written correspondence [38] have revealed a high degree of burstiness — periods of intense
activity followed by “lulls” of relative silence. Such correlations embedded in temporal
interactions have been shown to have effects on network dynamics above and beyond those
of temporality alone, for instance accelerating the spread of contagions [22, 39]. We have
verified that burstiness is present to varying degrees in the four data sets we study, in the
form of a power law distribution of inter-event times between the node activations (Fig. S2).
But to what extent do these patterns help or hinder the evolution of cooperation?
We have studied this question by randomizing the contacts in each of the datasets we
study, both their source and target (i, j) and their timestamps t. We stress that this ran-
domization has the effect of erasing bursty behavior at the level of individual node. In every
temporal network, we find that cooperation is improved when the natural burstiness is re-
moved in this way, suggesting that bursty behavior impedes the evolution of cooperation
(Fig. 4). For the effects of other null models that permute only the structure or the time
stamps of the contacts, please refer to Figs. S3 to S6, where we also show that the above
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results are robust after the data is randomized with various methods. Furthermore, this is
true for nearly all choices of parameters ∆t, g, and b. But how do we make sense of these
findings in relation to the observation above, namely that real temporal networks generically
promote cooperation?
C. Temporality determines the fate of cooperators
The parameters g and ∆t, and the burstiness represent three different facets of tem-
porality. Specifically, the relationship between the dynamical/structural timescales, the
amount the network structure is spread over time, and the correlations between the asso-
ciated snapshots, respectively. To understand the effects of these parameters in a unified
way, we introduce the following measure of the temporality T of a temporal network with
M snapshots as
T = 1
M − 1
M−1∑
m=1
∑
i,j |aij(m)− aij(m + 1)|∑
i,j max{aij(m), aij(m + 1)}
.
Here aij(m) is the connectivity between nodes i and j in snapshot m, being 1 if the nodes
have a contact in the associated time window and 0 otherwise, and the above fraction equals
to 0 for any two nearby empty networks without links. This measure captures the likelihood
that any currently inactive link will become active in the next snapshot (or conversely, that
an active link becomes inactive). If we need to replay the temporal network M is dT/∆te,
and dT/∆te − 1 if we do not. For a temporal network, generally 0 < T ≤ 1, and T = 0 for
static network where network topology does not change with time.
Figure 5 shows the value of T computed for the original and randomized versions of each
of the four data sets we study. We see that the original data displays high temporality,
which decreases following the randomization procedure (RPTRE) described above. Consid-
ering that fc for the randomized temporal networks is typically higher than in the originals
(Fig. 4), this suggests that too high temporality is inimical to the spread of cooperation,
instead fostering egoistic behavior. On the other hand, too low of a T is also associated
with diminished cooperation. For example, fc is not maximal in Fig. 2 for ∆t = 24, which
corresponds to snapshots that are relatively dense and slowly changing, paving the way for
defectors to extort cooperators. Altogether, the picture that emerges is one of an interme-
diate regime — a “sweet spot” of temporality in which cooperation is enhanced relative to
static systems.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Considering the real characteristics of human interactions where the underlying networks
are temporal and possess the underlying interactive patterns, we have addressed the evo-
lution of cooperation on temporal networks. After finding that temporal networks from
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empirical datasets favor the evolution of cooperation more than their static counterparts,
we also validate our results on synthetic networks. This central finding holds even after
the empirical data is randomized, thereby destroying specific temporal patterns (such as
bursts) characterizing real human interactions. Altogether, this suggests that temporality
— and temporality alone — is sufficient to improve cooperation. Interestingly, after ran-
domizations, we find that the level of cooperation is further improved suggesting that the
bursty nature of human interactions hinders the maintenance of cooperation to some degree.
At last, we demonstrate that the temporality of a temporal network determines the fate of
cooperators, with cooperators flourishing at intermediate values of the network temporality.
By virtue of both empirical and traditional synthetic data, our explorations systematically
illustrate the effects of temporality on the evolution of cooperation.
Note that the intrinsic temporal nature of the contact graph or interaction network is
fundamentally different from the slight change of population structure due to individuals’
migration [40–42]. The latter is usually restricted to the elaborate rules or strategies based
on a presumed synthetic static network [27, 29, 40–48]. The coevolution of the network and
strategy has been studied in the case where the network changes passively and with small
temporality under constant average degree and population size [49–54]. These coevolution-
ary dynamics arise from players’ strategic switch of partners, a process typically governed by
pre-determined mechanisms. However, it is unlikely that the natural temporality observed
in real human social dynamics is driven exclusively (or even primarily) by strategic switching
in pursuit of a given objective.
Another natural extension of the current work on temporal networks is to consider the
group interactions, which involve the interactions between individuals who are not directly
connected with one another [55–58]. These interactions generate much more dynamical
complexity, which cannot be captured by pairwise interactions [59, 60]. This is also true
in microbial populations, where even pairwise outcomes could predict the survival of three-
species competitions with high accuracy, yet information from the outcomes of three-species
competitions is still needed as we want to predict the scenario over more number of species
[61]. Moreover, the menu of strategies can be expanded beyond the simple dichotomy of
cooperation versus defection. For example, the canonical three strategies game rock-paper-
scissors, which may serve as a model to study the biological diversity in microbial populations
and communities [62–64].
Finally, our results have implications for other dynamical processes occurring on tempo-
ral networks. If we regard the evolution of cooperation on temporal networks as a spreading
dynamics of different strategies, it may serve as a new angle to investigate other related
dynamics. For example, consider epidemic spreading, where the temporal network charac-
teristics of networks had been shown to either speed up [22, 65] or slow down [37, 66] the
spreading, and the shuffle of time stamps was shown to enhance the spreading in a net-
work of sex buyers and prostitutes [39]. After evaluating the payoffs (benefits and costs) of
susceptible and infected individuals as they encounter one another, our framework of the
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evolution of cooperation may help us understand more phenomena including the epidemic
spreading on temporal networks.
METHODS
Empirical temporal networks. We construct temporal networks from empirical
datasets [30] by aggregating contacts into undirected network links over time windows of
∆t (Fig. 1a). Here, a contact is a triplet (t, i, j) representing the fact that individuals i and
j interacted during the time interval (t, t+ 20s]. In this way, we obtain a temporal network
with dT/∆te snapshots, where T is the total time span of the dataset and dze is the smallest
integer greater than or equal to z. Thus the active time interval for the snapshot m is from
(m− 1)∆t to m∆t, and a link between i and j exists if players i and j interact at least once
in that time period (Fig. 1b). We obtain a static network in the limit where ∆t = T .
Synthetic temporal networks. We generate temporal versions of scale-free and ran-
dom networks with size N and average degree 〈k〉 by first generating a base static network,
using static model [67] and the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model [36], respectively. We then form M
snapshots by randomly and independently choosing a fraction p of edges to be active in each
one. We have verified that our results hold under more sophisticated methods for building
temporal networks from a static network backbone, such as the activity-drive model [68]
Randomizations of empirical datasets. We consider four widely-used null models
[69] to randomize the empirical data: Randomized Edges (RE) where we randomly choose
pairs of edges (i, j) and (i′, j′), and replace them with (i, i′) and (j, j′) or (i, j′) and (j, i′)
with equal probability provided this results in no self loops; Randomly Permuted Times
(RPT), where we shuffle the timestamps of the contacts, leaving their sources and targets
unaltered; Randomly Permuted Times + Randomized Edges (RPTRE) which consists first
of RPT followed by RE; and Time Reversal (TR), where the temporal order of the contacts
is reversed.
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TABLE I. Statistics of the datasets. The four datasets we employed are interactions between:
attendees of a ACM Hypertext conference over about 2.5 days from 8am on Jun. 29th 2009 (ACM
conference), students in 5 classes at a high school in Marseilles, France over a period of 7 days
in Nov. 2012 (Student 2012), in 9 classes at a high school in Marseilles, France over 5 days in
Dec. 2013 (Student 2013), individuals in an office building in France, from Jun. 24 to Jul. 3, 2013
(Office 2013). The number of snapshots is calculated based on the total time window T over which
the data were collected, and ∆t (in seconds) is the time window used to aggregate the contacts
into snapshots. Contacts are defined as individual triples (t, i, j) in the data, meaning nodes i and
j were observed interacting in the time interval (t, t+ 20s]. Events (links), on the other hand, are
continuous interactions formed by coalescing time-adjacent contacts between the same i and j.
ACM conference Student 2012 Student 2013 Office 2013
Number of nodes 113 180 327 92
Number of snapshots d212, 360s/∆te d729, 520s/∆te d363, 580s/∆te d987, 640s/∆te
Number of contacts 20, 808 45, 047 188, 508 9, 827
Number of events (links) 9, 865 19, 774 67, 613 4, 592
Recording period (day) 2.5 7 5 14
Time resolution (second) 20 20 20 20
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FIG. 1. Construction of temporal networks from temporal interactions, and evo-
lutionary process on temporal networks. (a) Temporal interactions between 8 individuals
indicated by solid circles with different colors. Along the whole time from t = 1 to t = T , each
individual is depicted by the same color line, over which the corresponding circles will be given
and connected with each other at time t provided two players interact with each other during the
time interval (t − τ, t]. Here τ = 1 for the simplicity of visualizations, and normally in the real
data collected by SocioPatterns [30], τ = 20s. (b) Four different temporal networks that arise from
aggregating the interactions shown in (a) into snapshots using different time windows ∆t. When
∆t = T , all interactions are captured in a single snapshot, corresponding to the static network that
is the typical object of study in social network data. In general, when ∆t < T , we have dT/∆te
snapshots. (c) The definition of evolutionary process on temporal networks. Taking the temporal
network corresponding to ∆t = 4 in (b) as an example, we perform g generations of evolution
in each snapshot before changing the network structure to the next one, and totally we run G
generations until the composition of the population is stable. If dT/∆te ∗ g < G, we repeat the
sequence of snapshots from the beginning until convergence.
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FIG. 2. Temporal networks generally promote the evolution of cooperation in real
social systems. For four empirical datasets: (a) the ACM conference, (b) Student 2012, (c)
Student 2013, and (d) Office 2013, we show the stable frequency of cooperation on both temporal
(colored lines) and static (black dashed lines) networks with different values of the aggregation
time windows ∆t. We choose 1, 2, 6, 24 hours from left to right in (a) to (c) and 6, 8, 12, 24 hours in
(d), respectively. After letting the population evolve g generations on each snapshot, we average
over another 2, 000 generations after G = 106 generations on each temporal network, to obtain the
stable frequency of cooperators. The statistics of each dataset are given in Table I.
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FIG. 3. Evolution of cooperation on temporal networks generated from synthetic
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static model [67], and a base Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random [36] network, choosing a fraction p of edges to
be active within each snapshot. Here M = 100, the network size N = 1000, and average degree
〈k〉 = 10. The robustness of the corresponding results for other parameters and other methods of
generating synthetic temporal networks has been verified (see Fig. S1 in the SI).
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FIG. 4. The intrinsic bursty behavior in human interactions suppresses the mainte-
nance of cooperation. For each dataset, we show the difference fRPTREc − fORIc between the
stable frequency of cooperators fRPTREc in temporal networks generated from each dataset after
randomly permuting both the timestamps and edges (RPTRE in the Methods) which erases the
burstiness inherent to human interaction data (see Methods), and fORIc over the original scenarios.
We see that the frequency of cooperators generally increases after the bursty behavior is destroyed,
suggesting that correlations in activity within a social network is antagonistic toward the formation
of cooperation. Results on each dataset after randomizations with different null models [69] are
given in Figs. S3 to S6 in the SI. Other parameters are the same as those in Fig. 2.
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Figure S7 shows how the overall temporality T changes on a snapshot-by-snapshot basis, and the
corresponding standard deviation is given in this figure.
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FIG. S1. Evolution of cooperation on synthetic temporal networks. Here we generate M
sparse snapshots based on M different scale-free networks with preferential attachment [35] and
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks [36] with the network size N = 1000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4
(see Methods). Our results shown in Fig. 3 are also validated with different p, which determines
the level of link activity of each snapshot. Other parameters are the same as those in Fig. 3.
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FIG. S2. Bursty behavior in four datasets. For every dataset, we obtain a number of inter-
event time τ for each individual based on his or her interactive logs. For an individual, as the
number is bigger than 30, we fit all τ with power-law distribution P (τ) ∼ τ−γ , generating a γ and
an adjusted R2 [70]. For each dataset, we give the distributions of γ and the adjusted R2 for all
individuals there. The second row shows that there are intrinsic bursty behavior in every original
dataset.
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FIG. S3. Evolution of cooperation on temporal networks generated from the original
and randomized ACM conference dataset. For different null models, we show the stable
fraction of cooperators fc as a function of the dilemma parameter b for different g. RE and TR
have no effect on the correlations in temporal activity by construction, and hence have no effects
on network temporality apparently. RPT and RPTRE, on the other hand, destroy the temporal
correlations between edges, thereby lowering the (too high) temporality of the system. Actually
for the temporal network where we run g generation on each snapshot, the temporality of the
underlying population structure is about T /g. Thus for small g under RPT and RPTRE, fc is
increased markedly relative to the original dataset, while for large g the gains are more modest.
The above findings are also true for other datasets (see Figs. S4 to S6). Overall, our results showing
that temporal networks could facilitate the evolution of cooperation are robust even after the data
is randomized. Other parameters are the same as those in Fig. 2.
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FIG. S4. Evolution of cooperation on temporal networks generated from the original
and randomized Student 2012 dataset. Note that when ∆t is small, Randomized Edges (RE)
has the effect of breaking up the network structure within the (already sparse) snapshots, inhibiting
cooperation. Likewise, when g is big, RPT fails to improve fc either owing to the small resulting
temporality. All parameters are the same as those in Fig. 2.
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FIG. S5. Evolution of cooperation on temporal networks generated from the original
and randomized Student 2013 dataset. All parameters are the same as those in Fig. 2.
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FIG. S6. Evolution of cooperation on temporal networks generated from the original
and randomized Office 2013 dataset. All parameters are the same as those in Fig. 2.
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FIG. S7. How temporality arises from differences between successive snapshots. Each
time point shows the contribution to the temporality as defined in the main text made by each
pair of snapshots m and m + 1. The total temporality T is the average of these contributions.
Randomization methods that destroy temporal correlations in nodal activity (RPT, RPTRE) have
the effect of lowering this average. For every curve, we normalize the index of each snapshot under
different ∆t by dividing the corresponding dT/∆te.
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